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Abstract. Nowadays, complying with technical, sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) reg-
ulations and standards is becoming more and more demanding due to their prolifera-
tion and increasing complexity. Consequently, increasing requirements in plant health 
protection and food safety can lead to a loss of competitiveness in countries that are 
major exporters of fresh products, causing a redistribution of the market shares in 
certain sectors. Exporters complying with regulatory standards benefit from better 
market access and avoid boarder rejection or product downgrading but incur addi-
tional costs due to additional procedures and paperwork. This is the case for French 
apples producers which are losing competitiveness compared to the Chilean ones on 
foreign markets. This situation can be partially explained by the difficulties of French 
exporters to comply with international SPS requirements. The aim of this article is 
first to make a compilation of phytosanitary requirements facing French and Chile-
an exporters of fresh apples, then to propose a score (hereafter phytosanitary score) 
which allows to assess the degree of complexity of these SPS requirements. This score 
is interesting as it synthesizes qualitative information in a metric which can be eas-
ily used in quantitative analysis. The results show that even if France and Chile are 
rather close in terms of SPS requirements, Chilean apples exporters are more capable 
to comply with foreign SPS requisites than the French ones.
Keywords. Cost of compliance, scoring, apples, sanitary and phytosanitary regula-
tions.
JEL codes. C51, I18, Q18.
1. Introduction
The literature on sanitary and technical regulations has shown that if regulations 
and standards are market facilitators by decreasing asymmetries, they also hamper trade 
(Swinnen and Vandemoortele, 2011; Marette and Beghin, 2010). The effects that SPS regu-
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lations have on the economy depend on how they impact consumers, domestic producers 
and foreign competitors (Swinnen and Vandemoortele, 2009). The cost of production and 
marketing will increase with the increasing complexity of the regulations abroad. In the 
importing country, compliance with a regulation involves a cost to foreign suppliers, which 
acts like a trade tax, resulting in a deadweight loss as well as transfers from consumers to 
producers (Beghin and Bureau, 2002). On a specific market, foreign producers are impact-
ed by the SPS requirements depending on their relative differences in the marginal cost 
of the regulation, thus on their relative efficiency to comply with importers’ standards. 
This may affect countries that were major exporters, causing a redistribution of the market 
shares in certain sectors. It is the case for French apples exporters who compete now with 
newcomers as China which were not even producers 10 years ago.  
International trade of apples (and more generally of fruits and vegetables), requires 
that products intended for marketing come with a Phytosanitary Certificate (PC) which 
certifies that they are properly inspected, pest-free, and comply with national and interna-
tional phytosanitary regulations. However, regulatory constraints and requirements in the 
importing countries may differ substantially from those in the country of departure. This 
asymmetry directly impacts the phytosanitary risk management and therefore the costs 
of compliance. Usually, to deliver the PC for fresh apples, countries require either a cold 
treatment and/or fumigation with methyl bromide (APHIS USDA, 2014 Calvin and Kris-
sof, 1998). The former, even if simple to apply, can become quite complicated because the 
required temperature for cold treatment may vary from one destination to another. More-
over, if the majority of countries agree on a pre-shipment cold treatment, others require 
it during transportation or even at the port of arrival complicating the procedure. But the 
cold treatment is one among many requirements and paperwork an apple exporter faces 
before selling its products abroad. 
Even if a producer is able to comply with all these measures, a possible refusal of the 
apples still remains if at the port of arrival, a further inspection proves that something 
went wrong during the transportation or if the regulations have changed meanwhile. 
Rejections of apples occurred between the US and Japan in 2002, the US and Taiwan, 
Australia and New Zealand in 2007 (WTO, 2010) also between France and Vietnam in 
2012 (France Agrimer, 2015).
These examples illustrate that quantifying costs of compliance is not an easy task 
due to the proliferation of technical and sanitary regulations and standards and to their 
increasing complexity. Moreover, whereas models for policy analysis often require quan-
titative data, these regulations are often not quantitative. For qualitative standards, like 
labelling, no numerical values can be directly used. Further, these qualitative policies affect 
different components of costs of production and marketing and cannot be easily aggregat-
ed into a single price equivalent. Evaluating the protectionist component of these numerous 
qualitative policies into a protectionist score is likely to remain a challenge (Li and Beghin, 
2014). Several authors worked on the issue of introducing qualitative policy instruments 
in quantitative analysis by producing different synthetic indicators. Among others we can 
quote works on technological positions (Jaffe, 1986), regulations on Genetically Modified 
Organisms (Vigani et al., 2011) or varieties of grapes and wines (Anderson, 2010). More 
recently, Ferro et al. (2015), Li and Beghin (2014), Winchester et al. (2012) or Drogué and 
Demaria (2012) also built synthetic metrics to compare bilateral regulations on maximum 
residual level of food contaminants.
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In this article we build a phytosanitary score that allows approximating the relative 
complexity of phytosanitary requirements in the marketing of fresh apples. We compiled 
the sanitary and phytosanitary regulations French and Chilean apples exporters must 
comply with on their main markets of destination. These two countries have been chosen 
for two main reasons. First, at international level, in comparison with Chile, French pro-
ducers are losing market share, which could be explained by their difficulties to comply 
with international phytosanitary regulations. The second reason lies in the characteristics 
of the countries themselves. France is a traditional provider of apples with a long history 
of production and consumption, while Chile is a more recent producer export-oriented, 
and, being located in the Southern Hemisphere; apples in Chile are produced off-season. 
The indicator presented henceforth can be seen as a proxy for higher compliance cost 
born by exporting countries when shipping their apples abroad. This kind of indicator can 
be used in econometric models to evaluate the impact of non-tariff barriers on trade. At 
the same time, supply chain operators can also use it as synthetic information on the com-
plexity of phytosanitary requirements in importing countries. 
In order to compute our indicator, we first identified all the components of apples 
phytosanitary requirements Chile and France must comply with by destination (number 
of inspections, number of treatments and location of treatment, signature of an agreement 
between countries, etc.). Then, each component is graded with an increasing value accord-
ing to its degree of complexity; finally we sum them up in a normalized score.
Results show that the scores for France and Chile are rather close, but suggest that 
overall France suffers from more stringent foreign regulations and Chile is able to reach 
more easily any destination markets thanks to a better geographical position and phy-
tosanitary situation.
The originality of this work is a deeper understanding on sanitary and phytosanitary 
requirements that French and Chilean apples producers necessarily face if they decide to 
gain foreign markets’ share, and more particularly the design of a tool that allows to grade 
and to translate regulatory data into a single score useful for quantitative analysis. 
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 is an overview of the international mar-
ket of apples and the recent redistribution of market shares between countries in this sec-
tor. Section 3 is devoted to the presentation of the data on phytosanitary requirements. 
Section 4 presents the building of the score. Section 5 is devoted to the sample and the 
numerical results. Section 6 concludes.
2. The international market of apples
Compared with other markets of agricultural commodities, such as sugar, coffee or 
bananas, the apple world market can be broadly considered as residual: in 1961, only 9.5% 
of the world fresh production was traded on international markets and reached 11% fifty 
years later (2012). The main reason is that, historically, traditional producing countries 
(essentially Western countries) were also the main consumers. From the 90s, an evolu-
tion took place in the global geography of production and consumption, leading to evolv-
ing trade flows. The description of these changes is therefore important to understand 
the main opportunities and obstacles encountered by the major exporting countries (like 
France or Chile).
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According to the FAOSTAT database, apples are nowadays the second most pro-
duced and consumed fruit in the world after bananas and before oranges and grapes. Its 
production evolved greatly during the last 50 years, from 17 million tons in 1961 to more 
than 76 million tons in 2012 (+300%). This apparently linear development, hides some 
recent and deep changes in the geography of production. First and foremost, there is the 
spectacular increase, from the beginning of the 90s, of the Chinese production (Figure 
1). From just 1% of the world production in 1961, it represents today half the global out-
put in the world (48% in 2012)1. In general, during this same period there is a globalisa-
tion of apple production and traditional producers (as France or Italy) have lost mar-
ket shares in relative and absolute value, to the benefit of China and emerging countries 
(Figure 2). 
On the demand side, we observe the same evolution: in countries of traditional con-
sumption, with high incomes, saturated food demand, and with stronger health and 
environmental concerns, apples suffer the competition of other fruits, including exotic 
ones (Figure 3). In contrast, population growth recorded in emerging economies, com-
bined with higher average incomes and the dissemination of national and international 
education policies promoting fruit consumption2 explain the increase of their respective 
demand for fruits, especially apple, one of the easiest to store (Figure 3).
Finally, if the geographical area of apple production and consumption has greatly 
expanded in the last 20 years, the new consumer countries are not necessarily the produc-
ing ones. Therefore, and except for China, which is largely able to meet its own domestic 
1 What explains this phenomenon is the liberalization process of the Chinese market implemented by Deng 
Xiaoping (Murphy et al., 1992). His reforms have allowed the Chinese farmers to sell their excess production on 
the free market, leaving the market price system drive the allocation of productive investments.
2 WHO: http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2003/pr1/en/.
Figure 1. World apple market: production (with and without China).
Source: Faostat.
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demand, the increasing consumption of apples in developing countries (like India, Indo-
nesia or Brazil for example) represents a new opportunity for all exporters.
Among the major producing and exporting countries in 2012, Table 1 differentiates 
those for which the domestic market remains a priority (such as China) from those for 
which external demand represents a major challenge. In the latter category, Chile, France 
Figure 2. World apple market: production shares - selected countries.
Source: Faostat.
Figure 3. World apple market: per-capita apple consumption – selected countries.
Source: Faostat.
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and Italy3, represent about 30% of apple’s worldwide exports.
If in the following study, we limit the comparative analysis to France and Chile, thus 
excluding Italy, several reasons justify our choice. First, to avoid duplication effect: France 
and Italy have similar characteristics in terms of seasonality, produced varieties, produc-
tion conditions and supplied export markets. Second, the lack of data, especially regulato-
ry data (bilateral phytosanitary agreements), for Italy, does not allow us to add this coun-
try to the comparative analysis. 
Therefore, we focus on the comparison between France and Chile. These two coun-
tries differ not only in terms of geographical location, seasonality, climate characteristics 
or supplied markets4. They also face contrasting trends in exports. French apples exports 
are falling in the last 20 years, while they are increasing in Chile (Figure 4). These trends 
can partly be explained by the differences in importers’ SPS requirements.
3. Data description of phytosanitary requirements in the apple sector
Diseases and pest invasions vary greatly with place and time affecting the risk man-
agement and the protection of trees. The main pests damaging apples and apples orchards 
are: insects (codling moth, fire blight, sawfly insects, tortricid, aphids, and fruit tree spi-
der mites), fungal diseases (apple scab - Venturia inaequalis and powdery mildew - 
Podosphaera leucotricha) and viral diseases.
Viral diseases have been less damaging since plants carried a certificate which guar-
antees against the presence of the Mycoplasma-like Organism (MLO) disease, the apple 
mosaic or the bitter pit disease (affecting the fruit).
In order to mitigate the phytosanitary risk, regulators impose that crop products 
intended for marketing are accompanied by a Phytosanitary Certificate, defined above. 
3 We could add to this short list, New Zealand, a strongly export-oriented country. However, it does not repre-
sent a sufficient volume of exportations to be mentioned among the major players of the apple world market.
4 According to the detailed trade matrices published by Faostat, France exports about 75% to EU countries and 
11% to Asian countries (in particular middle east). Contrariwise, Chilean exports are more diversified: half of its 
exports concern the Americas (especially Canada and USA), 23% come to Asia and 23% to Europe.
Table 1. World apple market: production and export shares – selected countries.
Country National production  on world production (%)
National net exports  
on world exports (%)
National net exports on 
national production (%)
Italy 3.2 11.3 38.9
Chile 2.1 9.6 50.4
China 47.3 9.1 2.1
USA 5.6 8.2 16.0
France 2.4 7.1 31.7
Iran 2.4 1.3 5.7
Turkey 3.5 1.0 3.0
India 3.8 -1.8 -7.0
Source: Faostat, 2012.
45Measuring the complexity of complying with phytosanitary standard
These regulatory constraints and associated additional treatment operations impact the 
SPS risk management and increase, the costs of production and marketing. However, even 
if a producer is able to comply with all these measures, some possible rejection/refusal 
of products may still happen if at the port of arrival further inspection prove the pres-
ence of a pest. Rejections of apples occurred between the USA and Japan in 2002, the 
USA and Taiwan, Australia and New Zealand in 2007 (WTO, 2010) and in 2012 Vietnam 
stopped apples coming from France and re-negotiated a bilateral SPS agreement (France 
Agrimer, 2015). To illustrate the complex nature of pest risk management in the frame-
work of international apple trade, let’s take the example of cold treatment. Cold treatment 
is a common practice to fight main apple pests (especially Ceratitis capitata), which in 
some cases, must be associated to fumigation (APHIS USDA, 2014). The cold treatment 
requires that fruits must be stored at a constant temperature between 0° and 4° for a peri-
od of 14 to 21 days to prevent contamination of products by harmful organisms. Even if 
simple to implement, the cold treatment may become quite complicated because in case of 
a random interruption, the procedure must start again from the very beginning. An inter-
ruption is more likely to occur during shipment because temperature sensors cannot be 
verified easily and the common practice is that of cold treatment in transit5.
Moreover, doubts about the presence of pests or harmful organism in a given area 
may rise the alert level with consequent tightening of controls. This happened, with Viet-
nam, which denied market access to its trading partners between 2013 and 2015 in order 
to modify the phytosanitary regulations.
In this context analysing SPS regulations imposes a case by case analysis. Therefore, 
for the countries under scrutiny (France and Chile) we retrieved information from vari-
5 Source: EPPO, URL: https://www.eppo.int/QUARANTINE/data_sheets/insects/CERTCA_ds.pdf
Figure 4. France and Chile apple exports (1993-2013).
Source: Faostat.
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ous sources. The first and main sources of information are the websites of the national food 
safety authorities managed by the respective Ministries of Agriculture (Exp@don for France 
and the Servicio Agricola y Ganadero (SAG) / Department of agriculture and livestock for 
Chile). However, in some cases information was missing, thus we also consulted the World 
Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) maintained by the World Bank, the World Trade Organi-
sation (WTO) dataset and finally the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC). 
All this information was crossed-checked with experts from the SRAL (Service Regional de 
l’Alimentation / French Food Regional Service). The analysis of all the information at our 
disposal allowed us to identify an exhaustive list of the many requirements apples exporters 
face6. These requirements are of two types: (i) operational as the cold treatment or fumi-
gation: in this case the requirements from the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 
of the United States Department of Agriculture (APHIS/USDA) are the leading reference in 
many countries; (ii) administrative, taking the form of inspections or of declarations and can 
vary a lot according to bilateral agreements between the countries of origin and destination. 
We identify 9 requirements, called “dimensions” and described in the Box A2 in appendix.
To each dimension of the phytosanitary regulation we assigned a grade increasing with 
the complexity of implementation. The lowest grade is 0 (no constraints). Then, 1 when 
the regulation requires a form of monitoring easy to apply; a value equal to 2 or 3 when 
fulfilling the requirements is complex and finally the maximum value in case of a ban. For 
instance, the grade for the cold treatment ranges between 0 and 3. It takes a value equal 
to 0 if any cold treatment is required; a value equal to 1 if the cold treatment is applied in 
transit, a value of 2 when the regulation requires a cold treatment at the port of arrival and a 
value of 3 for ban. We assume that any kind of activity is more difficult or more expensive to 
implement in the country of destination than during the shipment or pre-shipment. Indeed 
(i) the absence of national operators in the foreign countries, (ii) the difficulties related to 
the use of different languages or different standards or (iii) the potential higher cost of the 
cold treatment activities in the foreign countries makes the procedure more difficult. 
The ban is not difficult to implement but it prevents all imports from the banned 
country; this is the reason why we consider the ban equivalent to assigning the highest 
grade to each dimension. Table 2 displays the grades by dimension. As we can see from 
table 2, the number and the values of each restriction vary from country to country 
depending on the underlying domestic regulation. Each phytosanitary requirement is con-
trolled and certified by the representative safety authority: the SRAL in France, the SAG 
in Chile. They perform the required inspections and deliver the phytosanitary certificates.
Once this evaluation has been made, in the next section we synthesize all the com-
ponents into one metric which gives the relative “phytosanitary distance” between the 
exporter (i.e. France or Chile) and their importers.  
4. Building a Phytosanitary Score
In order to assess the complexity of the overall SPS regulations imposed to French 
and Chilean apple exporters we built a Phytosanitary Score (hereafter PS). Follow-
6 The analysis was carried out between 2014 and 2016. During this period, no major changes took place in trade 
relations, except for the negotiation of a new bilateral protocol between France and Vietnam.
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ing Ferro et al. (2015), PS is designed as the sum of the grade obtained by each phy-
tosanitary constraint (dimension) imposed by the importing country to the exporting 
one. We then normalized it in order to obtain a value ranging between 0 and 1 and fur-
ther imposed convexity as in Li and Beghin (2014). In our analysis we consider that PS 
measures the relative severity of the phytosanitary constraints imposed by the importing 
country. 
Table 2. Dimensions and grades of the Phytosanitary Requirements and underlying regulations.
Dimension Values Underlying Regulations






- between France and China, 
Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, 
Thailand, Vietnam, USA
- between Chile and China, India, 
Taiwan, Thailand, USA, Mexico.
In the other cases, the information 
comes from:
- Exp@don database (for France)
- SAG database (for Chile)
- Wits database (by World Bank)
- Food Safety Authority of 
importing countries (Website)
Agreement
0 (No agreement needed)
1 (Agreement on pre-listing)
2 (Agreement on yearly check)
3 (Ban)
Import Permission
0 (No IP needed)
1 (The IP has been negotiated)




1 (The PC has been negotiated)
2 (The PC is under negotiation)








1 (Pre-clearance is required)
2 (Ban)
Pre-cold treatment/fumigation




0 (No cold treatment) 
1 (In transit cold treatment)
2 (At arrival cold treatment)
3 (Ban)
Inspection at arrival
0 (No inspection at arrival)
1 (Inspection at arrival)
2 (Ban)
Total Requirements 24 (maximum requirements)
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Subscript i denotes the exporting country and j importing country (here i is equal to 
France or Chile), PhytoijN is the grade of the requirement imposed by country j to country 
i in the dimension N; maxPhytoN is the highest grade in the dimension N; minPhytoN is 
the lowest grade in the dimension N. The PS indicator ranges between 1 (in the absence 
of any specific requirements) and e ≈ 2.72 which corresponds to the case of a ban, the 
greater the score the more difficult to comply with all the dimensions of the country of 
destination’s SPS regulation.
The advantage of introducing the convexity in the standard is that it imposes more 
weight on more demanding requirements suggesting that it is more difficult to reach high-
er standards and thus that the marginal cost of compliance is increasing. We are particu-
larly interested in verifying the relationships between trade and PS that is to say between 
trade and the phytosanitary requirement (Phyto). Our intuition being that the two vari-
ables are negatively correlated.  
5. Sample and results
Crossing data on French and Chilean apple exports during the period 1986-2013 with 
the sanitary regulations, we have been able to select a sample of 82 countries (over 146 
destinations in 2013) for France, and a sample of 51 countries (over more than 100 des-
tinations in 2013) for Chile (see the complete list of countries in table A1 in appendix). 
For the selected countries there is a positive flow of apples from France and Chile over 
the period and information on phytosanitary regulations is available. We exclude from our 
samples, countries with zero trade flows except when those countries imposed a ban on 
French or Chilean apples. The countries in the sample represent, for both exporters and 
for the entire period, 99% of their exports of apples on average.
Our sample can be disaggregated in 3 sub-groups. The first one gathers European 
countries which apply similar phytosanitary regulations (Directive 2000/29 CE, Euro-
pean Commission, 2000). In this common phytosanitary area, French apples move freely 
without control or particular certificates, while Chilean apples need a simple inspection at 
arrival. The second sub-group gathers 52 extra-European destinations for which French 
and Chilean apples must be accompanied by a PC or by a specific phytosanitary docu-
ment or both. The third group is constituted by countries which banned imports of apples 
from France or Chile (Indonesia, Japan, South Africa, South Korea and Tunisia). 
Table A1 in appendix reports the values of the scores for all countries importing 
French or/and Chilean apples. It shows in the first column the selected countries import-
ing apples from France; in the second column the values of PS; and in the third column 
the average trade in volume. Columns 4 to 7 display the same information for Chile.
This score is able to capture the degree of complexity of the regulation. In order to test 
the relationship between trade and the score we proceed by simple correlation analysis. 
In Figure 5 and 6, we can appreciate the position of both exporting countries in com-
parison to their own trading partners. It is interesting to note that the distribution of 
the phytosanitary score (PS) seem comparable in the two graphs: the group of European 
countries is always on the left of the distribution, while the group essentially composed 
by Asian countries is, in both cases, on the right. This illustrates that European countries 
apply relatively looser regulatory restrictions compared to Asian countries, regardless 
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of the source of exports. However, while it is obvious that France belongs to the group 
of European countries (as importer, Figure 6), it is also important to note that Chile as 
importer, belongs to the group of countries applying more complex regulations (as China, 
Indonesia, Taiwan, Thailand, or the USA).
The box plot in Figure 7 shows the distribution of PS by region. In this figure the higher 
the boxes the more demanding the phytosanitary requirements between France or Chile and 
their clients. First, we can observe that both exporters face similar average level of complex-
ity by region. However, France is almost always facing a higher degree of variability accord-
Figure 5. PS Country Mapping (France).
Figure 6. PS Country Mapping (Chile).
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ing to the destination.  This variability is at its maximum within the Asian countries. More 
generally, the variability increases with the level of complexity. It is also interesting to under-
line the results obtained for African destinations: while the phytosanitary requirements are 
strongly homogeneous vis à vis Chile, they are very heterogeneous for France.
The next Figures from 8 to 11 present the relationship between the importers’ com-
plexity of phytosanitary constraints and exports. In order to reduce the high trade vari-
ability, we aggregate trade volumes by countries sharing similar or identical phytosanitary 
scores. In the case of France, we are able to distinguish 6 ranges. Conversely, for Chile we 
only have 5 ranges, because of the strong requirements’ homogeneity.
Figure 8 suggests that for France, the level of trade is, as expected, inversely related to the 
level of complexity in the sanitary requirements of its partner, and reaches zero in the case 
of a ban (maximum restriction). Figure 9 shows that this result is globally confirmed, even 
when we eliminate extreme values, such as EU (no restriction) and bans (full restriction).
However, results are quite different for Chile. As Figure 6 shows, the phytosanitary 
constraints imposed to Chile by its trade partners are particularly homogenous (except 
for a few countries on the right side of the distribution). This strong homogeneity of the 
score does not allow us to discriminate between several ranges and therefore correctly test 
the correlation between trade flow and score value. Therefore, although figures 10 and 11 
show a negative and clear correlation between trade and the complexity in phytosanitary 
regulations (as for France), the results seem more difficult to interpret. 
In order to support our argument, we try to provide further analytical details about 
this topic. If we look at the trade between Chile and North-American countries, we can 
see that, while the volume of apples from Chile to the USA is important (103,000 tons on 
average between 2008 and 2013), this is not the case for Mexico (8,000 tons on the same 
period). The reason has to be found in the stronger demand of Mexican regulations. Yet, 
although the USA and Chile are located in the same continent (and thus closer in dis-
tance), Chile exports more with the EU (347,000 tons in average between 2008 and 2013) 
Figure 7. PS distribution by region (average and standard deviation).
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than with the USA. We suggest that the cause can also be attributed to the stringency of 
the US regulations in comparison with those of the EU. 
Another explanation could be found in the existence of a trade agreement between 
the two countries under scrutiny and their trade partners. Table A1 in appendix shows the 
existence or absence of a trade agreement. The information suggests that for France the 
geographical proximity and the existence of a trade agreement often overlap and the link 
Figure 8. PS value by range and volume of French apple export (2007-2013).
Figure 9. PS value by range and volume of French apple export (2007-2013) without EU countries.
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between the existence of the agreement and the level of trade cannot be clearly traced. 
Moreover, even if the EU (and therefore France) has signed a trade agreement with South 
Africa, South Korea and Tunisia, French apples are still banned from these countries for 
phytosanitary reasons.
For Chile, it is slightly different. There is no particular overlapping between the exist-
ence of a trade agreement and proximity. But there is also no clear link between the 
absence of a trade agreement and the absence of trade. Chile exports more apples to 
Colombia, Ecuador or Peru where no agreement has been signed compared to Brazil with 
Figure 10. PS value by range and average volume of Chile apple export (2007-2013).
Figure 11. PS value by range and average volume of Chile apples export (2007-2013) without USA.
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which an agreement has been signed. The same is true when the importer is farer: Chile is 
able to export high volumes even without the existence of a trade agreement; it is the case 
with India, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan or the Arab Emirates (see table A1).
6. Conclusion
For a long time, France has taken the world leadership in the apple international 
markets. But the French competitiveness is short of breath. French exporters point at the 
increasing complexity of the phytosanitary rules governing fresh fruits trade, especially in 
Asia and the USA. 
On the other side, Chile, a growing stakeholder in the apple sector has seen its 
exports increase regardless of the destination. Even if Chile benefit from its off-season 
supply with respect to its main destinations (USA, Europe, China), it seems generally less 
sensitive to the phytosanitary restrictions.  
Using a synthetic measure, we studied the link between the level of French and Chil-
ean apples exports and the complexity of the phytosanitary requirements imposed by 
importing countries. Analysing the regulations for more than 130 destinations (84 import-
ing countries for France and 51 for Chile), we were able to draw several conclusions. 
First, we observe that no significant difference between phytosanitary restrictions 
imposed to France and Chile by destinations exists; therefore, the distributions of PS in 
Figures 5 and 6 are rather similar for both exporting countries. 
Second, there is no clear link between the existence or absence of a trade agreement 
between the two countries and their trade partners and their capacity to penetrate a spe-
cific market.
Third, we have yet underlined that the French and Chilean positions inside the PS distri-
butions is not the same. France belongs to the EU which is less demanding in terms of phy-
tosanitary regulations, while Chile belongs to the group of countries applying more complex 
phytosanitary regulations (as China, Indonesia, Taiwan, Thailand or the USA). Therefore, this 
difference in the relative phytosanitary positions of France and Chile with respect to phytosan-
itary restrictions abroad, allows us to better explain why Chile resists better to more demand-
ing destinations in terms of phytosanitary regulations than France (see Figures 7 to 11). 
French exporters suffer higher costs in complying with phytosanitary rules, espe-
cially when they are imposed by the most dynamic importing countries (as Asian coun-
tries). For instance, French producers must make a greater effort in pest risk management 
in comparison to the Chilean producers, when they want to export apples free from the 
Mediterranean fly to China or Taiwan.
As emerging economies increase their consumption of fruits, with the increase in 
their per capita income, a new demand appears, especially in Asian countries, opening 
opportunities for apple growers and exporters.
However even if Chile and France face regulations from Asian countries (especially 
China, Taiwan or India), its geographical location, the off-season nature of its production 
and its natural phytosanitary conditions (Mediterranean fly free area) give the former an 
advantage in terms of capacity of compliance. In the Chilean case, as their phytosanitary 
restrictions are very close to those imposed by Asian countries or USA, it acts as a “com-
mon regulatory language”. It reduces asymmetries in pest risk management and facilitates 
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trade. Thus, it is possible to understand why Chilean exports to Taiwan or USA coexist 
with high score value: once the constraints overcome, due to a learning effect or similari-
ties in natural phytosanitary conditions, trade can unlock its potential.
In the French case, phytosanitary restrictions imposed by Asian countries or USA are 
the translation of really different natural and phytosanitary conditions. Then the regula-
tions imposed to France by third countries act as real barriers with high costs of compli-
ance (and learning).
These results, despite apparently opposed for France and Chile, are both consistent 
with the economic literature on international trade and non-tariff barriers, and suggest 
once more that sanitary and technical regulations can facilitate as well as hamper trade 
causing redistribution in the market shares.
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Algeria 1.16 63,437 Yes Algeria 1.18 601 No
Angola 1.24 46 No Bahrain 1.14 1,307 No
Australia 1.22 14 No Belgium 1.18 5,756 yes
Austria 1.07 614 Yes Bolivia 1.18 14,974 No
Bahrain 1.24 365 No Brazil 1.15 13,400 Yes
Bangladesh 1.28 261 No Canada 1.18 15,548 Yes
Belgium 1.07 37,748 Yes China 1.47 12,467 Yes
Brazil 1.21 2,049 No Colombia 1.15 68,894 No
Bulgaria 1.07 16 Yes Costa Rica 1.14 7,810 Yes
Canada 1.15 422 No Cyprus 1.18 535 Yes
China 1.47 638 No Denmark 1.18 1,952 Yes
Colombia 1.28 965 No Domin. Republic 1.25 1,705 No
Costa Rica 1.24 93 No Ecuador 1.07 44,748 No
Cote d’Ivoire 1.24 727 No Egypt 1.18 5,378 No
Czech Republic 1.07 449 No El Salvador 1.14 4,841 Yes
Denmark 1.07 12,580 Yes Finland 1.18 1,162 Yes
Djibouti 1.00 24 No France 1.18 9,452 Yes
Ecuador 1.20 57 No Georgia 1.18 327 No
Egypt 1.08 1,619 Yes Germany 1.18 12,456 Yes















Equat. Guinea 1.30 31 No Greece 1.14 5,028 Yes
Estonia 1.07 318 Yes Guatemala 1.18 5,403 Yes
Ethiopia 1.24 0.1 No Honduras 1.22 3,243 No
Finland 1.07 11,745 Yes Hong Kong 1.18 8,716 No
Germany 1.07 56,902 Yes India 1.47 20,605 No
Greece 1.07 96 Yes Ireland 1.18 2,530 Yes
Guinea 1.20 254 No Italy 1.18 10,135 Yes
Honduras 1.24 0.1 No Japan 2.72 0 No
Hong Kong 1.00 1,968 No Jordan 1.30 797 No
Hungary 1.07 54 Yes Kuwait 1.18 3,740 No
Iceland 1.07 65 Yes Latvia 1.18 360 Yes
India 1.19 339 No Libya 1.14 2,568 No
Indonesia 2.72 1,126 No Malta 1.18 495 Yes
Iran 1.24 1,576 No Mexico 1.51 8,053 Yes
Ireland 1.07 20,274 Yes Netherlands 1.18 63,406 Yes
Israel 1.46 1,021 Yes Norway 1.18 3,990 Yes
Italy 1.07 3,952 Yes Oman 1.14 1,814 No
Jordan 1.28 213 Yes Panama 1.19 1991 No
Kazakhstan 1.18 103 Yes Peru 1.22 38,402 No
Kenya 1.28 199 No Portugal 1.18 2,978 Yes
Kuwait 1.20 2,226 No Qatar 1.18 1,193 No
Latvia 1.07 72 Yes Russia 1.18 38,062 No
Libya 1.20 2,992 No Saudi Arabia 1.18 49,620 No
Lithuania 1.07 718 Yes South Korea 2.72 0 Yes
Luxembourg 1.07 1,092 Yes Spain 1.18 21,593 Yes
Malaysia 1.11 4,885 No Sweden 1.18 5,573 Yes
Maldives 1.00 276 No Taiwan 1.47 41,995 No
Malta 1.07 7 Yes Turkey 1.18 2,266 Yes
Mauritania 1.20 657 No UAE 1.18 26,322 No
Mayotte 1.07 438 Yes United Kingdom 1.18 31,919 Yes
Morocco 1.10 914 Yes USA 1.51 103,697 Yes
N. Caledonia 1.03 163 Yes Venezuela 1.18 28,416 No
Netherlands 1.07 66,287 Yes
Nigeria 1.36 3 No
Norway 1.07 2,279 Yes
Oman 1.24 2,631 No
Poland 1.07 644 Yes
Portugal 1.07 25,520 Yes
Romania 1.07 78 Yes
Russia 1.21 26,118 Yes
Saudi Arabia 1.12 16,631 No















Seychelles 1.20 56 No
Singapore 1.09 3,770 No
Slovenia 1.07 36 Yes
South Africa 2.72 40 Yes
South Korea 2.72 0 Yes
Spain 1.07 101,845 Yes
Sri Lanka 1.28 49 No
Sudan 1.24 479 No
Sweden 1.07 9,104 Yes
Switzerland 1.07 643 Yes
Taiwan 1.47 287 No
Thailand 1.45 3,375 No
Togo 1.20 200 No
Tunisia 2.72 18 Yes
Turkey 1.28 204 Yes
United Arab 
Emirates 1.10 16,033 No
Uganda 1.17 14 No
United Kingdom 1.07 132,141 Yes
Uruguay 1.22 24 No
USA 1.52 25 No
Venezuela 1.22 200 No
VietNam 1.38 120 No
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Box A1. SPS requirements description.
1. Ban and Territorial restriction. The ban forbids all exports of a product towards a third country. The ban 
may be justified either because of the presence of a quarantine organism in the country of origin but in 
the country of destination, as it is the case in Tunisia or in South Africa for French apples. Furthermore, 
countries of destination can temporary refuse imports as in the case of the apples from USA in Japan and 
from France in Vietnam (see above). Territorial restriction/Quarantine organism restriction: the importing 
country can impose to its providers that goods crossing its borders originate only from specific parts of 
the country of origin where quarantine organisms are absent or under control. For instance, France has 
negotiated a protocol with Indonesia which makes sure that only apples from the region «Pays de la Loire» 
can be exported. China and Taiwan impose similar restrictions to Chile. Area restriction is then an actual 
trade restriction. 
2. Accreditation: is a more advanced form of territorial restriction. For instance, China or Taiwan establishes 
a precise list of orchards, of storage and packing facilities, of exporters with the domestic sanitary 
authorities. The list of accredited organisms can be defined in different ways. In the simplest case it is the 
local authority (in France the SRAL) which compiles the list of producers complying with phytosanitary 
requisites and the importer only needs to approve or not the list. Or, the importing country may decide 
to approve the list after the inspection of the producing units by its own inspectors. The frequency of 
inspections may vary according to what has been agreed upon by both parties. 
3. The import permit (IP): this document is required by few countries imposing additional/reinforced 
inspections of goods. For instance, Israel phytosanitary authorities require that 2% of the total French 
exports are examined by local authorities (SRAL). Similar requests are addressed to Chile by countries 
like Honduras or Bolivia. In both cases, it is a more demanding control compared to the one usually 
performed by national sanitary authorities to deliver the PC. It is for this reason that the results of IP’s 
inspections are quoted in the PC in the box “additional documents”. 
4. The Phytosanitary Certificate (PC): in the simplest case (as it is the case for France vs. Norway), the PC is 
obtained after a visual inspection by the SRAL of apples to be exported. Thus, issuing the PC is equivalent 
to an inspection. In more complex cases, the PC must mention also all the additional inspections required 
by the importing country and certified by the SRAL (origin of the products, agreement, import permit, 
cold treatment etc.) 
5. Pre-inspection (or internal inspection): is an additional inspection required by a few countries among 
which USA and Taiwan. It is also qualified as double internal inspection because it must be implemented 
by the storage/packing employees before and during the packing operations. This double checking must be 
validated by the national Safety Authority. 
6. Pre-clearance is an additional pre-shipment inspection required by the USA. The pre-clearance procedure 
must be performed by the APHIS/USDA inspectors and APHIS/USDA trained domestic inspectors (from 
the SRAL). Moreover, the volumes of the sample intended for inspection are defined by the APHIS/USDA 
regulation and are larger than those usually required by the SRAL (it is the reason why the presence of the 
SRAL is necessary during the samples’ inspection). However, though we have to consider here the pre-
clearance as a simple additional inspection, negotiations between USA and Italy or New Zealand show that 
pre-clearance is a heavier system of export control (2 or 3 inspections) which can coincide in the French 
case with a mix of pre-inspections and cold treatment.
7. The pre-cooling/fumigation: in case of the presence of the Mediterranean fly in the producing country, 
some importers require that the exporter prove that before the loading of apples in the refrigerated 
container, the merchandise has already reached the temperature recommended by the regulation (pre-cold 
treatment) or has been subjected to fumigation (with Methyl bromide). In this case the exporter requests 
the national Safety Authority to certify the apples have been subject to fumigation or pre-cooling during 
the storage and they have reached the temperature needed to start the cold treatment. 
8. The cold treatment requires that fruits must be stored at a constant temperature between 0° and 4° for a 
period of 14 to 21 days to prevent contamination of products by harmful organisms. For all destinations 
requiring the cold treatment during the transit, the SRAL is requested to inspect and certify all the stages 
of loading in the refrigerated containers and the position of the sensors. The SRAL certifies the first stage 
of the process. 
9. Inspection at arrival: it is a final and additional (or unique) inspection performed by representatives of the 
local phytosanitary authority, which sets the volumes of the samples to be inspected.
